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Abstract 
 
In this paper we apply meta-analysis to a sample of 64 empirical studies to identify the 
potential moderators to the relationship between board, audit committee characteristics and 
voluntary disclosure. We examine whether the results are affected by the differences in the 
construction of disclosure index, the type of voluntary disclosure, the method of disclosure, 
the definitions of variables relating to corporate governance, the level of investor protection, 
and country geographic location. We find that, whilst board size, board composition and audit 
committee have a significant positive effect on voluntary disclosure, CEO duality has a 
significant negative effect. In addition, country geographic location moderates the association 
between board size, board composition, CEO duality and voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, 
the association between CEO duality and voluntary disclosure is moderated by disclosure 
type, disclosure method and the level of investor protection. Finally, differences in the 
definitions of explanatory variables moderate the association between board composition and 
voluntary disclosure. We conduct a sensitivity analysis which provides evidence that, in 
respect of the time period, prior to 2002, CEO duality has a significant negative effect on 
voluntary disclosure and has an insignificant effect for the period thereafter. 
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The impact of board and audit committee characteristics on 
voluntary disclosure: a meta-analysis 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Although disclosure theories suggest a positive association between corporate governance and 
disclosure, empirical research offers mixed results (Wang & Hussainey, 2013). Brown, 
Beekes, and Verhoeven (2011:153) note that since the literature on corporate governance 
“already has a degree of maturity, most improvements will be incremental”. Generally, 
empirical evidence is restricted to only one country and, consequently, this may reduce the 
capability to ascertain and generalize the research findings which limits the theoretical 
development of this research area. To gain a better understanding of the association between 
corporate governance and voluntary disclosure, we conduct a meta-analysis of 64 empirical 
studies1.  
Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004: 319  & 320) state that, “In the debate over director 
efficacy, prior literature primarily focuses on four board characteristics; (i) board 
independence, (ii) board size, (iii) committee structure, and (iv) specific occupational 
characteristics or expertise of independent directors”. The worldwide codes of best practice 
recommend that a corporation should have a large and independent board of directors; 
separate roles for the chairman and CEO; and a large and independent audit committee 
(Gregory, 2009). Given this importance, we focus on these governance attributes2.  
For this paper, our motivation is to reconcile the inconsistent research findings and draw 
logical conclusions which are not obvious from narrative reviews. Narrative reviews suffer 
                                                 
1 64 studies as compared to the 27 studies in García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta (2010). 
2 In order to assess meta-analytically the effect of internal governance attributes on voluntary disclosure, it is necessary to 
have a sufficiently large number of studies which address empirically a particular research question. Our decision to focus on 
specific mechanisms is influenced by this criterion. Initially, we look for other board characteristics including the number of 
meetings and the percentage of financial expertise. However, given the limited number of studies, we discard these variables 
in order to obtain robust meta-analytic findings.  
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from a lack of acceptable rules to extend the individual results to generalized findings. 
Therefore, these can lead to false conclusions since, generally, the differences of the 
significance across studies are attributed to the sampling errors (Rosenthal, 1991).   
Our paper offers three novel contributions. First, when compared to Pomeroy and Thornton’s 
(2008) and García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta’s (2010) studies, we offer distinguishing 
features. Pomeroy and Thornton (2008) focus on the independence of audit committee whilst 
García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta (2010) examine board independence and ownership 
concentration. We complement this line of research by considering several corporate 
governance attributes (board size, board composition, CEO duality and audit committee). 
Second, by focusing on intellectual, social, environmental and internet disclosures, we are 
motivated by García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta (2010:622) who call for “new analyses, 
studying for example whether the results depend on the type of voluntary information reported 
(social, environmental, intellectual capital, etc.)”. Finally, we examine whether disclosure 
index construction, disclosure method, the definition of explanatory variables and research 
settings2 moderate the results reported in the empirical literature.  
Our meta-analytic findings show that country geographic location moderates the association 
between board size, board composition, CEO duality and voluntary disclosure. In addition, we 
find that the level of investor protection, the type and the method of disclosure affect the 
relationship between CEO duality and voluntary disclosure. Finally, we document that the   
proxies used to measure explanatory variables moderate the relationship between board 
composition and voluntary disclosure.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
formulates the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data collection. Section 4 presents the 
methodology. Section 5 reports the results. Section 6 concludes. 
                                                 
2 We use an updated classification of countries and investor protection ranking. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
Board and audit committee characteristics are considered as key determinants of corporate 
reporting policy (Chau & Gray, 2010; Chen & Jaggi, 2000). In this section, we review the 
theoretical foundations for the association between board size, board composition, CEO 
duality, audit committee and voluntary disclosure.  
2.1. Board Size 
Board size may play an important role in promoting corporate transparency. For instance, a 
large board size may be beneficial to the firm since it increases the pool of expertise and 
available resources (Hidalgo, García-Meca, & Martínez 2011). Based on the concept of expert 
power, a large board size allows diverse experiences and opinions which, in turn, increase the 
board’s supervisory capacity implying more voluntary disclosure (Gandia, 2008).  
On the other hand, Herman (1981) argues that large boards are more likely to be ineffective. 
For instance, Lipton and Lorsh (1992) suggest that the arrangement of meetings and the 
reaching of a consensus, concerning some issues discussed during the board meetings, are 
more difficult for a company characterized by a large board. Therefore, the board’s 
monitoring ability is reduced implying less effectiveness and, consequently, less voluntary 
information.  
Empirical studies are supportive of a positive association between board size and voluntary 
disclosure (e.g. Abeysekera, 2010; Allegrini & Greco, 2013). However, other empirical 
works, including Arcay and Vazquez (2005) and Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010) 
find that there is an insignificant association between both variables. Therefore, we formulate 
the following non-directional hypothesis: 
H1: There is an association between board size and voluntary disclosure. 
2.2. Board Composition 
 5 
Agency theory suggests that the existence of independent directors on the board may have a 
significant impact on the effectiveness of board’s monitoring activities (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). Based on the reputation effect, Patelli and Principe (2007) argue that, by providing 
more voluntary disclosure, outside directors may gain greater public esteem to build their 
reputations as expert monitors in the labor market. García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta (2010) 
use the ‘domino effect’ concept of independent directors to push inside board members to 
improve corporate reporting policy through more voluntary disclosure.  
By contrast, Patelli and Principe (2007) suggest that outside directors are normally appointed 
by dominant shareholders. In case of collusion with them, the monitoring role of independent 
directors will be limited (Demb & Neubauer, 1992). Under these conditions, the presence of a 
high proportion of outside directors may have a negative effect on voluntary disclosure.  
The empirical evidence on the association between board composition and voluntary 
disclosure is inconclusive. While Adams and Hossain (1998) and Cheng and Courtenay 
(2006) find a significant positive association between voluntary disclosure and board 
composition, Abdelsalam and Street (2007) and Eng and Mak (2003) document a negative 
association between both variables. Therefore, we formulate the following non-directional 
hypothesis:  
H2: There is an association between board composition and voluntary disclosure. 
2.3. CEO Duality 
A combined leadership structure may facilitate CEO entrenchment (Pfeffer, 1981) and it is 
considered as the primary cause of the misalignment of interests (Kim, Al-Shammari, Kim, & 
Lee, 2008). On the one hand, Fama and Jensen’s agency framework (1983) indicates that a 
unified leadership structure reduces the importance of the separation between decision control 
(chair of the board) and decision management (CEO). Accordingly, CEO duality may 
constrain the desired system of checks and balances and compromise the board independence 
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in overseeing top management behavior (Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007). On the other hand, the 
CEO has a superior knowledge of the private information dealing with the firm’s competitive 
advantages and its internal conditions. Therefore, duality may limit the complete transfer of 
private information between the CEO and board members resulting in less voluntary 
disclosure (Kim et al., 2008).  
However, Anderson and Anthony (1986) point out that duality enables a clear-cut leadership 
in the formulation and the implementation of firm’s strategy and this leads to greater 
efficiency.  They argue that a unified leadership structure reduces information sharing costs 
and conflict of interests between CEO and non-CEO chairman. Proponents of duality also 
highlight the importance of clear lines of authority and unity of commend to reduce conflicts 
and improve decision making (Rhoades, Rechner & Sundaramuthy, 2001). Therefore, CEO 
duality may result in more voluntary disclosure.  
We also note that the empirical evidence on the relationship between voluntary disclosure and 
CEO duality is mixed. Whilst Allegrini and Greco (2013) and Li et al. (2008) document a 
significantly negative association between CEO duality and voluntary disclosure, other 
studies (e.g. Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002) report an insignificant or a 
positive association between both variables. Therefore, we formulate the following non-
directional hypothesis: 
H3: There is an association between CEO duality and voluntary disclosure. 
2.4. Audit Committee 
The key role of audit committee is to assist the board of directors in overseeing corporate 
reporting policy (Pincus, Rusbarsky, & Wong, 1989). For instance, Arcay and Vazquez 
(2005) suggest that, in terms of clarity, relevance and completeness of information an audit 
committee plays a crucial role in fulfilling investors’ needs for information. As a control 
mechanism over top management, an audit committee ensures that there is an increased 
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voluntary disclosure to allow an accurate assessment of the top management’s decisions and 
behaviors (Allegrini & Greco, 2013) and align the management’s and the shareholders’ 
interests (Laksmana, 2008). Therefore, such a monitoring mechanism is expected to improve 
corporate reporting policy. For instance, The Blue Ribbon Report (1999) and the Smith 
Report (2003) suggest that the audit committee plays a pivotal role in monitoring board 
activities by improving the quality of the disclosed information and ensuring the protection of 
shareholders’ interests through the release of price-sensitive information. 
Generally, we note that empirical studies are supportive of a positive association between 
audit committee characteristics and voluntary disclosure (Al-Shammari & Al-Sultan, 2010; 
Barako et al. 2006 and Ho & Wong, 2001).  By contrast, some studies do not find such an 
association (e.g. Allegrini & Greco, 2013 and Mangena & Pike, 2005). Therefore, we 
formulate the following non-directional hypothesis: 
H4: There is an association between audit committee characteristics and voluntary disclosure. 
2.5. Variables intervening in the association between board, audit committee characteristics 
and voluntary disclosure  
 
By considering the potential moderators to the relationship between governance attributes and 
voluntary disclosure, we move beyond a simple statistical summary of the association 
between them. Six potential moderators are successively discussed below.  
First, we identify three types of voluntary disclosure scores; total, social, environmental and 
intellectual capital disclosures. Total disclosure includes different types of information such 
as historical, financial, social, environmental and intellectual capital information. Total 
voluntary disclosure is oriented specifically towards stock markets participants and improves 
investors’ abilities to predict future earnings (Gelb & Zarowin, 2002). The main part of total 
disclosure score deals with historical financial information (Lim, Matollcky, & Chow, 2007). 
Intellectual capital information targets, also, investors’ needs since it deals with the firm’s 
future prospects and provides both strategic and competitive advantage information (Meek, 
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Roberts, & Gray, 1995). By contrast, social and environmental disclosure is dominated by 
information concerning firms’ social and environmental actions. Therefore, this kind of 
information is reserved specifically to satisfy stakeholders’ needs and signal firm’s legitimacy 
in its society (Lim et al., 2007).  
Since these three types of disclosure integrate different aspects of information and target 
diverse users of information, different factors are expected to influence each type of 
information (Lim et al, 2007).  This is particularly true for the board of directors which is, 
generally, aligned with shareholders and focuses on the maximization of profits rather than 
serving stakeholders’ interests (Adams, Licht, & Sagiv, 2011). Wang and Dewhirst (1992) 
argue that board characteristics (e.g. CEO duality and the percentage of outside directors) may 
have an impact on the board’s stakeholder orientation and, consequently, on social and 
environmental disclosure. Lim et al. (2007) find that board characteristics have different 
effects on disclosure types. 
Given the fact that, generally, audit committee and board members are considered as 
representative of shareholders’ interests (Ayuso & Argandona, 2007), they are more likely to 
be in line with investors’ needs and put more emphasis on financial and strategic information. 
By contrast, the CEO, who is, also, the chair of the board, will try to reduce financial 
disclosure to preserve his/her dominant position on the board and facilitate his/her 
entrenchment. In addition, the proprietary costs theory predicts that CEO will try, also, to 
reduce the extent of social and environmental disclosure in order to improve the firm’s 
performance in the short term and increase his/her own compensation. Therefore, we 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
H5: Disclosure types intervene in the relationship between board, audit committee 
characteristics and voluntary disclosure. 
 
Second, we note that the disclosure method (annual report versus company website) may 
moderate the relationship between voluntary disclosure and the examined governance 
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attributes. The annual report is a statutory document that management produces on an annual 
basis. According to Marston and Shrives (1991) and Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) annual 
reports represent the “main disclosure vehicle,” and the most comprehensive financial report 
available to the public. The structure of annual report is formalized. Therefore, one can 
compare the content of these reports between companies. By contrast, web-based disclosure is 
optional, freely accessed by all types of investors and requires supplementary costs of 
preparing and updating the firm’s website. Consequently, there is an expectation that the 
board of directors and audit committee members will put more emphasis on the formal 
communication channel (i.e. annual report disclosure). Therefore, we formulate the following 
hypothesis:  
H6: Disclosure method (annual report versus company website) intervenes in the relationship 
between board, audit committee characteristics and voluntary disclosure. 
 
 Third, we also note that the conflicting findings across studies can be attributed to the 
diversity of the respective countries’ legal and institutional systems. For instance, the level of 
investor protection may affect the relationship between board of directors, audit committee 
characteristics and voluntary disclosure (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
1998). We note that, in an environment characterized by a high level of investor protection, 
directors face more litigation risk. Consequently, they are inclined to improve corporate 
reporting policy in order to reduce the information asymmetry between large and minority 
shareholders. By contrast, a CEO, who is, also, the chair of the board, will try to reduce the 
extent of voluntary disclosure in order to diminish, in a high investor protection setting, 
litigation risk. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H7: The level of investor protection intervenes in the relationship between board, audit 
committee characteristics and voluntary disclosure. 
 
 Fourth, legal origin and institutional characteristics play an important role in shaping 
corporate governance mechanisms and their effects on voluntary disclosure (García-Meca & 
Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010). For instance, Ahmed and Courtis (1999: 36) suggest that ‘these 
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inconclusive results could be due to differences in socio economic and political environments 
between countries’.   
The Report on Observance of Standards and Codes (e.g. Egypt, 2009) suggests that, whilst 
many directors may be outside the firm, they may not be truly independent since, generally, 
they have close relationships with large owners. Similarly, in Kenya, Barako et al. (2006) 
suggest that outside directors are not truly independent since they have close relationships 
with large shareholders. This situation may compromise the board’s and the audit committee’s 
roles in enhancing corporate reporting policy.  When directors are not truly independent, the 
CEO will operate in a more comfortable situation which, in turn, increases his/her discretion 
over corporate reporting policy. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis:  
H8: Country geographic location intervenes in the relationship between board, audit 
committee characteristics and voluntary disclosure. 
 
Fifth, we note that there is no definitive theoretical guidance concerning how to construct a 
disclosure index and, consequently, researchers develop the index often based on their 
objectives (Artiach & Clarkson, 2011). Whilst some researchers use a dummy variable 
approach to measure voluntary disclosure, others estimate the extent of voluntary disclosure 
using a disclosure checklist. According to Bravo, Abad, and Trombetta (2010), the second 
approach is more able to capture the richness of firm’s voluntary disclosure policy.  
Accordingly, we place studies into two groups to assess the moderating effect of the 
disclosure index construction on the association between voluntary disclosure and the 
examined governance attributes. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H9: The construction of the disclosure index intervenes in the relationship between board, 
audit committee characteristics and voluntary disclosure. 
 
 Finally, we note that prior meta-analyses on the determinants of voluntary disclosure (García-
Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010; Khlif & Souissi, 2010), argue that, the differences in the 
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definition of explanatory variables, can affect the hypothesized relationships3. The empirical 
literature uses three main proxies to measure board composition, namely, board independence 
(e.g. Patelli & Prencipe, 2007), non-executive directors (e.g. Haniffa & Cooke, 2002), and 
independent non-executive directors (e.g. Ghazali & Weetman, 2006).  Corporate governance 
literature (e.g., Dalton et al., 1999) suggests that, in substance, executive directors are not so 
independent. Therefore, we expect that this proxy for board composition is less linked to 
voluntary disclosure. Similarly, we note that audit committee characteristics are measured 
using different proxies including the existence of an audit committee, the percentage of 
independent members and the size of audit committee. This diversity of measures may also 
moderate the relationship between audit committee and voluntary disclosure. Therefore, we 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
H10: The proxies, used to measure board size, board composition and audit committee 
characteristics, intervene in the relationship between these governance attributes and 
voluntary disclosure. 
 
3. Sample of studies included in the meta-analysis 
We conduct an extensive search for relevant articles. We collect papers from several 
accounting and finance journals indexed by Science Direct, EJSEbsco, Blackwell, Springer, 
Emerald, Inderscience, ABI Inform, and Social Science Research Network (SSRN). Our 
initial search uses keywords including: “voluntary disclosure and corporate governance 
mechanisms”. The term voluntary is then replaced by “internet-based, intellectual capital and 
social and environmental”. In order to identify the maximum number of empirical studies 
dealing with such a topic, we replace the word “corporate governance” with “board 
characteristics”, “CEO duality” and “audit committee”. We also consult specialized journals 
of accounting and finance (e.g. Corporate Governance: An International Review, Journal of 
Management Governance) and references in the collected studies. Initially, we search for 
                                                 
3 With the exception of some studies that use a dummy variable that takes 1, if directors on the board exceed a 
certain number and, 0 otherwise, board size is measured commonly by the number of directors. 
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several board characteristics including board size, board composition, CEO duality, the 
number of audit committee meetings, the percentage of financial expertise, and audit 
committee characteristics. However, we focus only on board size, board composition, CEO 
duality and audit committee characteristics and we discard the other board characteristics 
given the limited number of studies allowing us to obtain robust meta-analytic findings. 
Our searches yield a total of 64 research articles between 1997 and 2013. Amongst the 64 
papers, 34 articles are published in top ranked journals (Elsevier, Wiley-Blackwell, Springer, 
Francis & Taylor); 14 in decent journals (Emerald, Inderscience and Macmillan); 15 papers 
appear in other journals; and only Fleo’s (2010) paper is available in SSRN. Therefore, 53 per 
cent (34/64) of the studies examined are published in ranked journals implying more 
reliability of the statistical inferences in our meta-analysis. Table 1 illustrates the sample 
selection process and Table 2 presents the studies included in the analysis. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
 
4. Meta-analysis technique 
Meta-analysis is an alternative to a narrative literature review. It is defined as a statistical 
method to summarize and analyze previous quantitative empirical literature. Narrative review 
may be misleading since individual studies may have different characteristics in term of 
sample size, variables proxies and time period (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990).  The meta-analysis 
technique allows researchers to examine the effect of these different data characteristics on 
the findings of primary studies (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990; Rosenthal, 1991). 
4.1. Effect size 
In meta-analysis, the effect size measures the magnitude of the relationship between two 
variables. In our study, it represents a metric proxy of the degree of connection between 
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voluntary disclosure and explanatory variables4. Meta-analytic data should be analyzed using 
the following three steps as suggested by Hunter et al. (1982) and Hunter and Schmidt (2000).
 
(i)  Firstly, the mean correlation ( r ) is calculated as:
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where Ni is the 
sample size and ri, is the Pearson correlation coefficient for study i. 
(ii) Secondly, the observed variance ( 2rS ) and the sampling error variance (
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(iii) Finally, the estimates of population mean ( r ) and the standard deviation KS r
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normally to construct a 95 per cent confidence interval. 
In order to test for moderating variables and determine whether the observed variance is 
trivial or higher than expected, a chi-square statistic (
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  (4)) is used to assess 
whether the observed variance is due to moderating effects or to some statistical errors.
 
 If the 
computed chi-square statistic is inferior to the tabulated one, the association is considered to 
be homogeneous and the variation in results across studies is due only to some statistical 
errors. Nevertheless, if the computed chi-square statistic is significant at the 5 per cent 
significance level, we conduct further analyses to test for moderators and reduce the 
heterogeneity in the observed variance.  
4.2. Moderating factors 
We consider six moderating variables. Disclosure score is classified into: total score (TS); 
intellectual capital disclosure (ICD); and social and environmental disclosure (CSED).  As the 
second moderating factor, we consider annual reports disclosure against internet-based 
                                                 
4 In computing the effect size from the reported statistics, different procedures can be used. When a study reports Pearson’s r 
coefficient, such a statistic is used to calculate the effect size between voluntary disclosure score and explanatory variable. 
When other statistics such as Student t and Z value are reported, the following formulas are used to compute the effect size 
respectively
)( 2
2
dft
t

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disclosure.  In the third and fourth moderating factors, we examine the moderating effect of 
country geographic location5 and the level of investor protection6. As the fifth moderating 
factor, we consider the approach used to measure voluntary disclosure (disclosure checklist 
versus a dummy variable: 1 if the information is disclosed and 0 otherwise). Finally, board 
size is sub-grouped into:  the number of directors on the board; and a dummy variable. Board 
composition is sub-grouped into: the percentage of independent directors (PID); the 
percentage of independent non-executive directors (PIND); and the percentage of non-
executive directors (PND). Audit committee is sub-grouped into: dummy variable (DV): 1 if 
audit committee exists and 0 otherwise; the number of audit committee members (NAC) and 
the percentage of independent non-executive directors (INDC). 
5. Results 
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the study’s results. In each table, we present, firstly, the results of 
the overall meta-analysis and, if the homogeneity test is rejected, we conduct refined analyses 
according to the moderating factors cited above. 
5.1. Board size 
The board size has a mean correlation of 0.193 (Z= 8.137) with a 95 per cent confidence 
interval between 0.146 and 0.239 (Table 3 A). Therefore, the results support hypothesis H1. 
However, only 41.659 per cent of the observed variance is explained by the sampling error 
variance. This indicates a high degree of heterogeneity across studies. This is also evident 
                                                 
5 We group together countries which share several similarities in terms of disclosure policy; directors’ liability; and the ease 
of shareholders suits. Based on the World Bank’s classification, we identify the following five groups : (i) MENA including 
Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Turkey;  (ii) OECD high income countries including Australia, Canada, France, 
Greece, Italy, Ireland, New Zealand, Spain, UK and USA; (iii) Sub-Saharan Africa (SA) including Kenya, Nigeria and 
Zimbabwe; and  (iv) East Asia Pacific (EAP) including Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia,  Malaysia and Singapore.   
6 We classify studies with respect to the level of investor protection in the countries examined. High (low) investor protection 
countries are those which have an investor protection ranking inferior (superior) to the median of our sample. 
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from the significant (p < 0.01)7 chi-square statistic of 64.810. In order to reduce 
heterogeneity8, we undertake further tests for moderating variables. 
When we conduct a sub-group meta-analysis with respect to disclosure type (social and 
environmental, intellectual and total score disclosures), there remains a significant association 
regardless the type of disclosure. Similarly, disclosure method (annual report versus web-
based) does not moderate the examined relationship. Therefore, we establish that H5 and H6 
are not supported. In addition, when the checklist approach is used to measure disclosure 
score, the relationship is also significant with a mean correlation of 0.192 (Z = 8.152).9 
When we examine the moderating effect of the level of investor protection, the results show 
that the association remains significant for high and low investor protection groups (0.224; Z 
= 10.246) and (0.183; Z = 3.878) respectively. Therefore, H7 is rejected. With respect to 
geographic location, the association remains significant for OECD high income countries 
(0.252; Z = 6.224), East Asia and Pacific settings (0.210; Z = 8.617) and Sub-Saharan African 
countries (0.226; Z = 3.321). By contrast, the relationship becomes insignificant for MENA 
region (0.068; Z = 0.753). Therefore, H8 is supported. However, this result should be 
interpreted with cautions given the insufficient number of studies for some regions (e.g. 
MENA and Sub-Saharan African settings).    
Finally, the meta-analytic results show that there is only a significant association between 
board size and voluntary disclosure when the former is proxied by the number of directors on 
the board with a mean correlation 0.200 (Z = 8.403), whilst, as measured by a dummy 
variable (-0.001; Z= -0.026), there is an insignificant association. Therefore, H10 is supported. 
                                                 
7 The tabulated chi-square, with a degree of freedom of (27-1= 26) at significance level of 0.01, accounts for 45.642. 
8 Corporate governance literature (e.g. Boone, Field, Krapoff and Raheja, 2007) suggests other moderating factors including 
firm size, firm’s degree of diversification and tension between monitoring and strategy roles. However, the primary data, 
which we collect from empirical studies, does not allow us to control these moderating factors in respect of the relationship 
between board size and voluntary disclosure.  
9Since only the paper of Buniamin et al. (2008) uses a dummy variable approach, we can not test for H9. 
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However, given the limited number of studies for dummy variable group, this result should be 
interpreted with cautions. 
5.2. Board composition 
As shown in Table 3 (B), the relationship between voluntary disclosure and board 
composition has a mean correlation of 0.115 (Z = 6.096) and a 95 per cent confidence interval 
between 0.078 and 0.152. Since the overall explanatory power of this variable is substantially 
low ( 2
1K
 
= 194.498; p < 0.001), we undertake further analyses to test for the presence of 
moderating variables.  
When we sub-group studies according to disclosure scores, there is, also, a significant 
association for total, social, environmental and intellectual capital scores. Therefore, these 
results do not confirm H5. When we classify studies according to disclosure method (annual 
report versus web), the findings show that there remains a significant association for web-
based disclosure (0.108; Z= 2.469), and annual report disclosure (0.116; Z = 5.596). 
Therefore, H6 is rejected. Furthermore, when we conduct a sub-group meta-analysis with 
respect to disclosure index construction, the findings show a significant mean correlation of 
0.125 (Z = 6.076) for the checklist index group. By contrast, the relationship becomes 
insignificant for the dummy variable index group with a mean correlation of 0.046 (Z = 
1.100). Therefore, the construction of  disclosure index moderates the relationship and H9 is 
supported. This result should be interpreted with cautions given the limited number of studies 
using a dummy variable approach.  
Another moderating variable, the definition of board composition, shows that the studies, 
employing the percentage of independent directors and independent non-executive directors, 
have significantly positive mean correlations of 0.137 (Z = 7.056) and 0.167 (Z = 3.870) 
respectively. On the other hand, the association becomes insignificant for studies employing 
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the percentage of non-executive directors (0.047; Z = 1.018)10. Our results are in line with 
García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta (2010) who, also, find that there is an insignificant 
association between the percentage of non-executive directors and voluntary disclosure. 
Therefore, the proxies used to measure board composition moderate the relationship. These 
findings support H10.  
When we classify studies according to the level of investor protection, the results remain 
significant for high and low investor protection groups (0.117; Z = 5.247) and (0.112; Z= 
3.561) respectively. Hence, H7 is not supported.  
With respect to geographic location, there is a significant association for OECD high income 
countries (0.134; Z = 5.283) and East Asia Pacific countries (0.125; Z = 4.799). By contrast, 
there is an insignificant association for MENA settings (0.059; Z = 1.161) and Sub-Saharan 
African countries (-0.102; Z= -0.974). Consequently, country geographic location moderates 
the relationship and this supports hypothesis H8. 
Insert Table 3 about here   
               
5.3. CEO duality 
Table 4 (C) shows that there is a significant negative relationship between CEO duality and 
voluntary disclosure with a mean correlation of -0.053 (Z = -2.796) and a confidence interval 
between -0.091 and -0.016.  We reject the homogeneity test since 33 per cent of the observed 
variance is explained by the sampling error variance. This is also evident from the significant 
(p<0.01) chi-square statistic of 97.581. Therefore, we conduct further analysis to test for the 
presence of moderating variables.   
When we classify studies according to disclosure score, there remains a significant negative 
association for social and environmental score -0.064 (Z = -3.441) and total score (-0.070; Z= 
-1.950), while it is insignificant for intellectual capital information (-0.001; Z = -0.020).  
                                                 
10 We exclude the study of Abeysekera (2010) from the analysis since it uses the number of independent 
directors on the board.  
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Therefore, these results support hypothesis H5. As predicted by the proprietary costs theory, 
the dissemination of social and environmental information increases disclosure costs. CEO 
will try to avoid such a type of voluntary disclosure to improve the firm’s short term 
profitability and, thus, his/her own compensation. When we examine the moderating effect of 
disclosure method, we document that the negative association is maintained for annual report 
disclosure (-0.061; Z = -2.748), whilst it is insignificant for internet-based disclosure (-0.006; 
Z = -0.023). Therefore, these results also support hypothesis H6.  
Moreover, since there is a significant association for the disclosure checklist method (-0.053; 
Z = -2.551) and the dummy variable approach (-0.062; Z = -5.428), we conclude that the 
disclosure construction approach does not moderate the association. 
When we examine the moderating effect of the level of investor protection, we find that there 
is a significantly negative relationship for high investor protection group (-0.081; Z =               
-3.892), whilst it becomes insignificant for low investor protection group (-0.024; Z =              
-0.762).  Therefore, these results support hypothesis H7. Our findings are consistent with those 
reported by Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009), which suggest that, despite the high quality 
judicial systems, the litigation process reduces managers’ incentives to disclose information. 
Similarly, we find that the country geographic location moderates the relationship between 
CEO duality and voluntary disclosure since there is only a significant negative association for 
OECD high income countries with a mean correlation of -0.072 (Z= -2.167) and a confidence 
interval between -0.138 and -0.007. Therefore, these results also confirm hypothesis H9.  
5.4. Audit committee 
Table 4 (D) reports the results of 22 studies in respect of the relationship between audit 
committee and voluntary disclosure. The overall meta-analysis results show a significant 
association between both variables with a mean correlation of 0.199 (Z = 6.498) and a 95 per 
cent confidence interval between 0.139 and 0.260. Therefore, H4 is accepted.  The computed 
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chi-square statistic of 103.002 (p<0.05) and the percentage of observed variance explained by 
the sampling error variance of 21.358 indicate a high degree of heterogeneity across studies. 
Therefore, we undertake further analyses to identify moderators.  
When we study the moderating effects related to voluntary disclosure, the relationship 
remains significant regardless the type of disclosure score, the approach used to construct 
disclosure index and the disclosure method. Therefore, these results do not support 
hypotheses H5, H6 and H9. The lack of moderation for disclosure type and tool should be 
interpreted with cautions given the limited number of studies for some disclosure types 
(social, environmental and intellectual capital information) and internet-based disclosure. 
When we sub-group studies according to the proxies used to measure the audit committee 
variable (the percentage of independent directors, the number of audit committee members 
and a dummy variable), the association remains significant with mean correlations of 0.105 (Z 
= 4.039), 0.171 (Z = 3.195) and 0.293 (Z = 6.322) respectively. Therefore, the proxy used to 
measure the audit committee variable does not moderate the relationship and H10 is rejected.    
Finally, we undertake further meta-analytic comparisons by grouping studies according to the 
level of investor protection and country geographic location. The meta-analytic findings show 
that, for all the groups, the significant relationships remain. Therefore, the level of investor 
protection and country geographic location do not moderate the examined relationship and, 
thus, H7 and H8 are rejected. Here it should be noted that, given the limited number of studies, 
the results, obtained for Sub-Saharan African and MENA countries, have to be interpreted 
with cautions.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
A summary of meta-analytic results is shown in Table 5. 
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
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5.5. Additional and sensitivity analysis11 
 
Before 2002, numerous financial scandals have accrued (e.g. Enron in the USA). Since meta-
analysis allows researchers to examine how time period affects the primary studies’ findings 
(Hunter & Schmidt, 1990), we control for time effect by considering the period before 2002 
(including 2002) and the period thereafter. We exclude all studies using samples spanning 
from the pre- to the post-2002 periods.  The results show that, for the pre- and post-2002 
periods, there remains a significant association between board size, board composition, audit 
committee and voluntary disclosure. However, for the pre-2002 period, there is a significant 
negative relationship for CEO duality (-0.096; Z = -3.238), while there is an insignificant 
relationship (-0.039; Z = -1.671) for the post-2002 period. We also conduct tests of equality of 
means for pre- and post-2002 periods. Results show that there is an insignificant change for 
the association between board size and voluntary disclosure with a T-statistic of 0.216. For 
board composition, the mean correlation witnesses a significant increase moving from 0.105 
for the pre-2002 period to 0.124 for the post-2002 period with a T-statistic of 6.998. For CEO 
duality, the mean correlation moves from -0.096 for the pre-2002 period to -0.039 for the 
post-2002 period with a significant T-statistic of 22.110. Finally, the mean correlation for 
audit committee witnesses a significant decrease moving from 0.284 for pre-2002 period to 
0.184 for the post-2002 period with a T-statistic of -16.650. 
In order to test whether the publication bias influences the conclusions drawn from our meta-
analysis, we apply Orwin's (1983) approach to determine the extent of the file drawer 
problem. This method requires the estimation of the fail-safe N being the number of 
unreported studies with insignificant results required to reduce the mean effect size to a 
                                                 
11Although several authors call for the control of endogeneity when examining the association between disclosure and 
corporate governance attributes (e.g. Core, 2001; Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2003) as for corporate governance and corporate 
performance, the majority of studies dealing with this stream of research consider corporate governance attributes as a 
determinant of disclosure policy.  Therefore, it is not possible for us to control for reverse causality or endogeneity since 
primary studies in their models consider voluntary disclosure as a consequence of board and audit committee characteristics.      
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specified criterion12. We calculate the fail-safe N when significant associations are reported. 
The file drawer analysis indicates the stability of significant results obtained for the overall 
samples since the fail-safe N ranges from 33 for board size to 14 for CEO duality. When sub-
samples include a limited number of studies, the computed fail-safe Ns also indicate the 
stability of the results for audit committee variable (MENA and Sub-Saharan African settings) 
and board size (Sub-Saharan African settings). 
We conduct another sensitivity analysis with respect to the type of items included in the total 
scores. We identify 14 studies13 which focus exclusively on financial information in their 
disclosure index. For board size and audit committee, there remains a significant association 
for financial information and mixed information scores. By contrast, for board composition, 
the significantly positive association is maintained only for financial scores (0.132; Z = 
3.581), whilst it is insignificant for mixed information scores (0.074; Z = 1.907) with a 
confidence interval between -0.002 and 0.150. Similarly, there is a significant negative 
association between total score and CEO duality only for financial scores (-0.097; Z =              
-3.110), whilst it is insignificant for the mixed information scores (-0.050; Z = -0.810). This 
sensitivity test also supports hypothesis H5 since disclosure type moderates the association 
between board composition, CEO duality and voluntary disclosure. 
Moller and Jennions (2001) suggest that the meta-analytic results may be affected by the 
publication bias since quality journals tend to accept studies with significant results. 
Therefore, we divide our overall sample into two groups: (i) quality journals and (ii) low 
quality journals. The results show that the publication quality does not moderate the 
relationship between board size, board composition, audit committee and voluntary 
                                                 
12
We calculate the fail-safe N using the following equation:


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
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0
0
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KK k ; K0: the fail-safe N or the number of insignificant, 
unpublished studies; K: the number of studies included in the meta-analysis; ESk: the effect size of studies included in the 
analysis and ES0 :the criterion effect size level which   would reduce the effect size.  
13 The studies which deal exclusively with financial information are as follows: (Adams & Hossain, 1998; Allegrini & Greco, 
2013; Apostolou & Nanopoulos, 2009; Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Baek et al., 2009; Bujaki & McConomy, 2002; Cheng & 
Courtenay, 2006; Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Juini, 2013; Fleo, 2010; Khodadadi et al., 2010; Mangena & Pike, 2005; Mangena & 
Tauringana, 2007 and Mohamad & Sulong, 2010). 
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disclosure. By contrast, the publication quality moderates the association between CEO 
duality and voluntary disclosure since the mean correlation accounts for -0.064 (Z = -2.447) 
for high quality papers, whilst it amounts to -0.044 (Z = -1.599) for low quality journals. 
The analyses, presented above, include all the effects from all the studies which may cause a 
stochastic dependence amongst the observations. In order to address this concern, we use only 
one observation per study as a sensitivity analysis. The sensitivity meta-analytic findings 
show that there remains a significant association with a high degree of homogeneity for board 
size, board composition and audit committee. The mean correlations and chi-square statistics 
account for (0.207 (Z = 7.561); 2 1K = 0.600); (0.143 (Z = 6.437);
2
1K = 1.323); and (0.237 (Z 
= 6.824); 2 1K = 0.655) respectively. By contrast, there is an insignificant association for CEO 
duality since the mean correlation and chi-square statistic account for (-0.035 (Z = -1.439); 
2
1K = 0.668). 
Finally, we control for outliers in our meta-analysis14 15. For board size, we identify 5 studies 
as outliers. After dropping them from the analysis, the mean correlation becomes 0.202 (Z = 
8.623) with an insignificant 2 1K  of 23.929.  Similarly, we identify 9 outliers for the 
association between board composition and voluntary disclosure. Following their elimination, 
the association becomes more significant (0.125 (Z= 8.397); 2 1K = 123.874). After dropping 3 
studies identified as outliers, there is, also, a more significant relationship for CEO duality      
                                                 
14
We identify outliers by using the Huffcutt and Arthur’s (1995) sample-adjusted meta-analytic deviancy statistic (SAMD). 
For each study, we compute the SAMD as follows:
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effect size of the study is not considered to be an outlier if it is close to 0 (Huffcutt and Arthur, 1995). In our analysis, we 
consider a cut-off point of 1.5.  Each study that has a standardized absolute value of SAMD that equals or exceeds 1.5 is 
considered as outlier and we eliminate it.  
15 The studies identified as outliers are as follows: (i) board size (Arcay & Vazquez, 2005; Allegrini &  Greco, 2013; Gandıa, 
2008; Prado-Lorenzo & Garcia-Sanchez, 2010; Samaha et al. 2012); (ii) Board composition (Abdelsalam & Street, 2007; 
Adams & Hossain, 1998; Barako et al., 2006; Eng & Mak, 2003; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Khan et al, 2013; Mallin et al. 
2013; Mangena & Pike, 2005; Samaha & Dahawy, 2011); (iii) CEO duality (Rouf, 2011; Al-Janadi et al. 2013; Chau & Gray, 
2010) and (iv) audit committee (Barros et al., 2013; Li et al., 2008; Mangena & Pike, 2005 Samaha  & Dahawy, 2011).  
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(-0.058 (Z= -4.341); 2 1K = 40.863). Finally, after dropping 4 studies considered to be 
outliers, the association between audit committee and voluntary disclosure becomes more 
significant (0.226 (Z= 9.884); 2 1K = 34.384). The exclusion of outliers leads to more 
homogeneous relationships since the percentage of the observed variance explained by the 
sampling error variance amounts to 100 per cent for board size, board composition and CEO 
duality, while it is about 75 per cent for audit committee. Here, it should be noted that the 
results generated from sub-group meta-analyses remain stable after the exclusion of outliers.   
6. Conclusion 
In this meta-analysis, we investigate the link between board size, board composition, CEO 
duality, audit committee and voluntary disclosure. We also test whether the relationships are 
moderated by the differences in disclosure type, method and construction; the differences in 
research setting; and the differences in the measurement of explanatory variables. Our 
primarily meta-analytic findings show that there is a significant positive association between 
board size, board composition, audit committee and voluntary disclosure, while CEO duality 
has a significant negative effect on voluntary disclosure. Our sub-group meta-analytic results 
provide evidence that country geographic location moderates the association between board 
size, board composition, CEO duality and voluntary disclosure.  In addition, disclosure type, 
disclosure method and the level of investor protection moderate the association between 
voluntary disclosure and CEO duality. Finally, differences in the definition of the explanatory 
variables moderate the association between board composition and voluntary disclosure. Our 
sensitivity analysis with respect to the time period provides evidence that, prior to 2002, CEO 
duality has a significantly negative association with voluntary disclosure. However, for the 
period following 2002, CEO duality has an insignificant effect on voluntary disclosure. 
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Overall, our meta-analytic findings emphasize the need to explicitly consider the country 
geographic location when one analyzes the association between board characteristics and 
voluntary disclosure.  In addition, the negative effect of CEO duality on voluntary disclosure 
is more pronounced in high investor protection settings implying that the litigation process, in 
high quality judicial systems, reduces managers’ incentives to disclose information. 
One limitation of our results is the ‘apples and oranges’ problem caused by the wide range of 
econometric methodologies used to estimate the effect size. However, recent accounting 
literature applied largely meta-analysis and our analysis is in line with previous meta-analyses 
(e.g. García-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010). In addition, the meta-analysis technique 
represents a simple test of the association between two variables and it does not allow us to 
control for endogeneity or reverse causality if the primary study does not control such an 
issue. Since the empirical disclosure studies, included in our meta-analysis, do not address 
this issue, we find it impossible to control for endogeneity.  
Several avenues for future research exist. Firstly, there is a need for more research on the 
problem of endogeneity between voluntary disclosure and corporate governance. Secondly, 
since virtually all studies dealing with the impact of corporate governance on voluntary 
disclosure eliminate financial companies from their samples, it will be interesting to study 
explicitly, for financial companies, the impact of corporate governance on voluntary 
disclosure to see if there is a significant difference from those of non-financial companies. 
Finally, the association between the voluntary disclosure of executive compensation and 
board characteristics represents an interesting field of future research. 
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Table 1. Sample selection 
Initial sample 96 
Criteria leading to exclusion of studies:  
 Studies providing only descriptive statistics (3) 
 Other measures of disclosure (2) 
 CG variables not included in our meta-analysis (e.g. ownership 
attributes) 
(27) 
= Final sample 64 
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Table 2.  Studies included in the meta-analysis 
Studies Country 
No  
of firms 
Reporting 
years 
Disclosure 
 proxy 
Number 
of items 
Effect size (Pearson's coefficient) 
BOS BCOM CEOD AC 
Halme & Huse (1997) SC 140 1992 CSED     3 0.140    
Adams & Hossain (1998) New Zealand    34 1988-1993 TS 189  0.377   
Chen & Jaggi (2000) Hong Kong    87 1993-1994 TS   30  0.156   
Ho & Wong (2001) Hong Kong    98 1997 TS   20  0.108  0.210 
Haniffa & Cooke (2002) Malaysia  167 1995 TS   65  0.123 0.047  
Bujaki & Mcconomy (2002) Canada  269 1997 TS   25  0.223   
Eng & Mak (2003) Singapore  158 1995 TS   55  -0.157   
Gul & Leung (2004) Hong Kong  385 1996 TS   43  0.102 -0.141  
Xiao et al. (2004) China  300 2001 IBD   18  0.150   
Haniffa & Cooke (2005) Malaysia  139 2002 CSED   41  -0.241   
Arcay & Vazquez (2005) Spain   91 1999 TS   18 -0.038 0.306 -0.168 0.383 
Mangena & Pike (2005) UK 262 2002 TS 113  0.005  -0.097 
Barako et al.(2006) Kenya    43 1993-2001 TS   47  -0.220 -0.043 0.280 
Brammer & Pavelin (2006) UK  447 2000 CSED DV  0.093   
Cheng & Courtenay(2006) Singapore  104 2000 TS   72 0.256 0.278 0.085  
Ghazali & Weetman (2006) Malaysia    87 2001 CSED   53  -0.137   
Abdelsalem and Street (2007) UK 115 2006 IBD   11  -0.206 0.119  
Cerbioni & Parbonetti (2007) SC  54 2002-2004 ICD 132 0.209 0.316 0.139  
Huafang & Jianguo (2007) China 559 2002 TS   30   0.103 -0.082   
Boesso &  Kumur  (2007) Italy  36 2002 TS   42  -0.050   
Boesso &  Kumur  (2007) USA  36 2002 TS   42  0.260   
Lim et al. (2007) Australia 181 2001 CSED   21 0.247 0.204     
Mangena & Tauringana (2007) Zimbabwe   51 2002 TS   86 0.322 0.413   0.361 
Patelli &  Prencipe (2007) Italy 171 2002 TS   74   0.248     
White et al. (2007) Australia   96 2005 ICD   78   0.238     
Barako & Brown (2008) Kenya   40 2005 CSED   22   0.272     
Buniamin et al. (2008) Malaysia 243 2005 CSED DV 0.148 0.102 -0.050   
Donnelly & Mulcahy (2008) Ireland   51 2002 TS   50 0.430 0.340     
Ezat & El-masry (2008) Egypt   50 2006 IBD   11 0.305 0.262 -0.128  
Gandıa (2008) Spain   92 2003 IBD   32 0.481       
Kelton & Yang (2008) USA 284 2003 IBD   36   0.179 -0.056   
Li et al. (2008) UK 100 2005 ICD   61   0.340 -0.073 0.511 
Lim et al. (2008) Malaysia 743 2003 CSED   27   0.194 -0.082   
Apostolou & Nanopoulos 
(2009) Greece   72 2004 TS   56   0.338     
Baek et al .(2009) USA 374 2000 TS   99  0.113   
Cormier et al. (2009) Canada 155 2005 ICD   16 0.194 0.149   0.165 
Said et al. (2009) Malaysia 150 2006 CSED   41 0.232 -0.011 -0.055 0.153 
Abeysekera (2010) Kenya   26 2002-03 ICD    5 0.064 0.218     
Akhtaruddin & Haron (2010) Malaysia 124 2003 TS   64       0.120 
Al-Shammari & Al-Sultan 
(2010) 
Kuwait 
170 2007 TS   76   0.043 -0.054 0.155 
Chau & Gray (2010) Hong Kong 273 2002 TS   85   0.207 -0.267   
Fleo (2010) USA 429 2001 TS   98 0.192 0.174 -0.107   
Khan (2010) Bangladesh   30 2007-2008 CSED   60   0.550     
Khodadadi et al. (2010) Iran 106 2001-2005 TS   33   -0.007 -0.034   
Mohamad & Sulong (2010) Malaysia   40 2003 & 2006 TS   40   0.113 -0.115 0.145 
Nor et al. (2010) Malaysia   93 2005-2006 ICD DV   -0.023 -0.088   
Prado-Lorenzo & Garcia-
Sanchez (2010) 
SC 283 2007 CSED   27                                               0.061 -0.044 -0.163   
Siregar & Bachtiar (2010) Indonesia   87 2003 CSED   41 0.200       
Adebimpe & Peace (2011) Nigeria 48 2008 TS   60 0.302 0.051   
Hidalgo et al. (2011) Mexico 100 2005-2007 ICD   58 0.220 0.070 0.010 0.210 
Mert (2011) Tuerky 173 2009  IBD   60 0.037 0.148   
Rouf  (2011) Bangladesh 120 2008 TS 105 0.339 0.232 0.482 0.468 
Samaha & Dahawy (2011) Egypt 100 2006 TS   80   0.497   0.703 
Yap, Saleh & Abessi (2011) Malaysia 254 2008 IBD 270 0.182 0.161 0.062 0.122 
Cormier et al. (2012) Canada 136 2005 IBD 100 0.340 0.020 -0.110 0.260 
Li et al. (2012) UK 100 2005 ICD   61  0.340  0.216 
Michelon & Parbonetti (2012) SC 114 2003 CSED 178 0.217 0.076 -0.076   
Samaha & Abdallah (2012) Egypt   99 2011 IBD DV  0.268 0.292 0.199 
Samaha et al. 2012 Egypt 100 2008 IBD   72 -0.128 -0.164 -0.041  
Allegrini & Greco (2013) Italy 177 2007 TS   60 0.400 0.226 -0.238 0.061 
Al-Janadi et al. (2013) Saudi Arabia   87 2006 TS   21 0.270 0.417 0.275 0.107 
Barros et al. (2013) France 206 2006-2009 TS 112  0.024  0.057 
Juini (2013) Tunisia   22 2004-2009 TS   57 0.021 -0.066 -0.204  
Khan et al.  (2013) Bangladesh 116 2005-2009 CSED   20  0.269 0.003 0.325 
Mallin et al  (2013) USA 135 2005-2007 CSED 121  0.073 -0.071  
Notes: TS: total score; CSED: corporate social and environmental disclosure; ICD: intellectual capital disclosure; IBD: internet- 
based disclosure. BOS: board size; BCOM: board composition; CEOD: CEO duality; AC: audit committee. DV: Dummy variable: 1 
if the firm makes such a disclosure and 0 otherwise; SC: several countries. 
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Table 3.  Board size, board composition and voluntary disclosure 
  
Sample 
(N) 
Number 
of studies 
(K) 
Mean 
correlation r  
 
Observed 
variance  
2
rS  
Estimated error 
variance 
2
eS  
Percentage explained 
2
eS /
2
rS  
Z-statitic 95 % confidence interval 
 2 1K  
File-
drawer 
 Board size  (A)                   
Overall meta-analysis 3945 27 0.193*** 0.015 0.006   41.659 8.137 0.146; 0.239   64.810** 33 
Moderating factors           
TS  1290 10 0.229*** 0.017 0.007   40.076  5.509 0.147; 0.311   12.927**                   17 
CSED 1198   7 0.162*** 0.004 0.004 100.000  6.329 0.112; 0.212      5.817   6 
ICD   652   4  0.198*** 0.001 0.005 100.000  9.693 0.112; 0.212     1.190   5 
           IBD   805 
  805 
  6 0.176** 0.034 0.007   20.145  2.318 0.027; 0.365   29.783***   4 
Annual reports 3140 21 0.197*** 0.010 0.006   60.956  8.956 0.154; 0.240   34.450*** 27 
Disclosure checklist 3702 26 0.192*** 0.015 0.006   42.249  8.152 0.150; 0.245   61.538*** 31 
Number of directors 3802 25 0.200*** 0.014 0.006 42.549 8.403 0.153; 0.247  58.755*** 38 
Dummy variable   203   2 -0.001 0.002 0.013 100.000 -0.026 -0.068; 0.067    0.344 - 
           High protection  1729 10 0.224*** 0.005 0.005  100.000 10.246 0.267; 0.181     9.217 16 
Low protection  1534 13 0.183*** 0.027 0.008   27.207  3.878 0.090; 0.276   49.780*** 15 
           High income OCDE 1457  9 0.252*** 0.014 0.005   36.948  6.224 0.172; 0.331   24.358*** 19 
17 MENA  369  4 0.068 0.032 0.011   39.936  0.753 -0.109; 0.245   12.144***   - 
Sub-Saharan African   151  3 0.226*** 0.013 0.017 100.000  3.321 0.092; 0.360     2.347   5 
East Asia & Pacific   958  6 0.210*** 0.002 0.005 100.000  8.617 0.162; 0.258     3.756   9 
 Board composition (B)                   
Overall meta-analysis 12628 61 0.115*** 0.022 0.005  21.594  6.096 0.078;  0.152 194.498*** 19 
Moderating  factors           
TS 6728 31 0.100*** 0.023 0.005   19.119 3.633 0.046; 0.154 162.146***  5 
CSED 3258 13 0.139*** 0.021 0.004   18.165 3.465 0.060;  0.218  71.564***  8 
ICD 1131   8 0.165*** 0.017 0.007    38.964 3.565 0.074;  0.256  20.529***  8 
           Annual reports 11117 52 0.116*** 0.022 0.004    20.364 5.596 0.075; 0.156 206.237*** 17 
IBD  1511   9 0.108** 0.017 0.006   33.210 2.469 0.022; 0.195   27.099***  2 
Disclosure checklist 11651 57 0.125*** 0.022 0.005   21.041 6.076 0.081; 0.159 199.604*** 24 
Dummy variable    977   4 0.046 0.007 0.004   56.496 1.100 -0.036; 0.130   74.341***  - 
PID 7404 35 0.137*** 0.013 0.004   34.159 7.056 0.099; 0.176 102.459*** 21 
PIND 1497   9 0.167*** 0.017 0.006   33.569 3.870 0.082; 0.252   26.809***  9 
PND 3675 17 0.047 0.034 0.004   12.681 1.018 -0.043;  0.137 126.169***  - 
High protection 6895 33 0.117*** 0.016 0.004  27.698 5.247 0.073; 0.161 119.141*** 11 
Low protection 5422 27 0.112*** 0.026 0.004 18.990 3.561 0.050; 0.164 149.173***   8 
High income OCDE 5258 25 0.134*** 0.016 0.004 28.255 5.283 0.084; 0.184   88.878*** 14 
MENA 1341   8 0.059 0.021 0.006 28.075 1.161 -0.041; 0.160   28.494***   - 
Sub-Saharan African   581   4 -0.102 0.044 0.007 15.091 -0.974 -0.331; 0.104   26.505***   - 
East Asia & Pacific 4911 20 0.125*** 0.014 0.003 26.894 4.799 0.076; 0.182   74.346***   9 
Notes: TS: total score; CSED: corporate social and environmental disclosure; ICD: intellectual capital disclosure; IBD: internet-based disclosure; (PID): percentage of independent directors; 
(PIND): percentage of independent non-executive directors; (PND): percentage of non-executive directors; *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
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Table 4.  CEO duality, audit committee and voluntary disclosure 
  
Sample 
(N) 
Number 
of studies 
(K) 
Mean 
correlation 
r   
Observed 
variance  
2
rS  
Estimated error 
variance 
2
eS  
Percentage 
explained 
2
eS /
2
rS  
Z-statistic 95 % confidence 
interval 
 2 1K  
File-drawer 
 CEO duality  (C)                   
Overall meta-analysis 7918 33 -0.053*** 0.012 0.004   33.817 -2.796 -0.091; -0.016 97.581*** 14 
Moderating  factors           
TS 3814 15 -0.070* 0.019 0.004   19.906 -1.950 -0.102; 0.000 75.206***   4 
CSED 2334   7 -0.064*** 0.002 0.003 100.000 -3.441 -0.109; -0.027   5.752   2 
ICD   732   4 -0.001 0.006 0.005   83.124 -0.020 -0.080;  0.078   4.812   - 
IBD 1038   7 -0.006 0.006 0.007 100.000 -0.023 -0.064; 0.051   6.318   - 
Annual reports 6880 26 -0.061*** 0.013 0.003 29.308 -2.748 -0.104; -0.017 88.710***  8 
Disclosure checklist 7388 30 -0.053*** 0.013 0.004   30.823 -2.551 -0.094: -0.012 97.328*** 12 
Dummy variable   530   3 -0.062*** 0.000 0.005 100.000 -5.428 -0.084; -0.039 14.490  1 
           
High protection 3736 14 -0.081*** 0.006 0.004   60.702 -3.892 -0.122; -0.040 23.063***  2 
Low protection 3640 16 -0.024 0.016 0.004   26.871 -0.762 -0.087; 0.038  59.542*** - 
           
High income OCDE 1698   9 -0.072** 0.010 0.005 51.982 -2.167 -0.138; -0.007 17.343*** 2 
MENA 1168   7 -0.031 0.011 0.006 52.510 -0.761 -0.109; 0.048 13.330*** - 
East Asia & Pacific 3925 13 -0.050 0.005 0.003 21.354 -1.458 -0.117; 0.017 60.878*** - 
Audit committee (D) 
 
 
                  
Overall meta-analysis 4565 22 0.199*** 0.021 0.004   21.358 6.498 0.139; 0.260 103.002*** 28 
Moderating  factors           
TS 2691 13 0.168*** 0.026 0.004   17.304 3.741 0.082; 0.256  75.124*** 12 
CSED   730   2 0.289*** 0.005 0.002    47.605 5.894 0.193; 0.385   4.201***    5 
ICD   655   4 0.246*** 0.013 0.005   41.437 4.318 0.134; 0.293   9.653**    8 
IBD   489   3 0.176*** 0.003 0.006 100.000 5.091 0.108; 0.243   1.866    3 
Annual reports 4076 19 0.202*** 0.023 0.004   18.810 5.852 0.134; 0.270 101.005*** 25 
Disclosure checklist 4466 21 0.199*** 0.021 0.004   20.387 6.280 0.137; 0.262 103.004*** 27 
           
DV 1865   9 0.293*** 0.019 0.004   20.758 6.332 0.202; 0.384    43.356*** 21 
INDC 1493   7 0.105*** 0.005 0.004   96.476 4.039 0.054; 0.156      7.255   2 
NAC 1207   6 0.171*** 0.017 0.005   27.002 3.195 0.066; 0.277    22.219***   7 
            High protection 1709 11 0.160*** 0.012 0.006    49.372 4.778 0.094; 0.266   22.279***   9 
Low protection 2856 11 0.223*** 0.024 0.003    14.281 4.750 0.131; 0.315   77.022*** 17 
           
High income OCDE 1842   8 0.123*** 0.017 0.004   23.651 2.616 0.031; 0.216   33.824***   4 
MENA  456   4 0.275** 0.052 0.007   14.354 2.412 0.051; 0.499   27.864***   9 
Sub-Saharan African   481   2 0.288*** 0.001 0.003 100.000 16.365 0.254; 0.324     0.355   5 
East Asia & Pacific 1486   7 0.244*** 0.012 0.004   33.739   5.713 0.157; 0.322    20.747***   13 
Notes: TS: total score; CSED: corporate social and environmental disclosure; ICD: intellectual capital disclosure; IBD: internet-based disclosure. (DV): 1 if audit committee exists and 0 
otherwise; (NAC): number of audit committee members; (INDC): percentage of independent directors in the audit committee. *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.  
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Table 5. Summary of meta-analytic findings 
 
Variables Overall association 
(H1 –H4) 
Disclosure type 
H5 
Annual report vs 
Website 
H6 
Investor protection 
H7 
Geographic 
location 
H8 
Checklist vs Dummy 
H9 
Measurement 
of board 
proxies 
H10 
Board size Yes NO NO NO YES (1) (1) 
Board composition Yes NO NO NO YES (1) YES 
CEO duality Yes YES YES YES YES NO N/A 
Audit committee Yes NO NO NO NO, (1) NO NO 
Notes: (1) Insufficient studies in one or more sub-groups to test based on a combination of the number of studies (2, 3, or 4) and the file drawer number; N/A non applicable. 
